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PARENT & CHILD - LOSS OF CONSORTIUM NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT - TORT LAW: NORTH
DAKOTA ALLOWS RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF FILIAL
CONSORTIUM AND EXTENDS DOCTRINE OF NEGLIGENT

ENTRUSTMENT TO INCLUDE GUN RETAILER
On January 4, 1983 Steven Holen, then age fourteen, was seriously injured when fifteen-year-old William Boyer discharged a
twenty-two caliber pistol causing a bullet to strike Steven in the
head.' Steven's conservator, First Trust Company of North

Dakota, and Steven's mother, Karlene Holen, brought an action
against William, his mother Kathryn Boyer, and the gun retailer,
Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc. (Scheels Hardware), for
damages resulting from the injuries suffered by Steven.2 On the
day the pistol was purchased, William's mother accompanied him
to Scheels Hardware.' A Scheels Hardware salesperson handed
William a pistol which William showed to his mother.4 William

indicated to the salesperson that he and his mother would
purchase the pistol. 5 The salesperson assisted Kathryn in completing a federal firearms form and William carried the pistol to the
checkout stand.' William paid cash for the pistol and carried it out
1. First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, 429 N.W.2d 5, 7 (N.D. 1988).
The shooting was an accident. Id. William Boyer, Steven Holen, and two other boys were
visiting in William's bedroom just before the shooting. Id. It could be inferred from
conflicting testimony that Steven had secretly loaded the pistol. Id. When William pulled
the trigger, the pistol dry fired twice. Id. On the third squeeze, the gun discharged striking
Steven in the head. Id.
2. Id. at 8. The complaint alleged Scheels Hardware "negligently, carelessly, and
unlawfully sold, delivered, or otherwise transferred a pistol" to William. Id. Plaintiffs also
claimed that William was negligent when he shot Steven. Id. North Dakota law allows
damages for negligent actions which cause injury to others. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06
(1987Xa person who lacks ordinary care is responsible for injury to another person).
3. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 7. The evidence showed that William had saved
money for several months in anticipation of buying the pistol. Id. North Dakota law
prohibits a person from selling or transferring a handgun to someone who is younger than
eighteen years old. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-02 (1985); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-0302 (1985Xit is a class A misdemeanor to sell, barter, hire, lend, or give handgun to a minor).
North Dakota law regarding the transfer of handguns conforms to federal law in the same
area. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(bXlX1983Xit is unlawful for licensed firearms dealers to sell
"any firearm or ammunition to any individual who the licensee knows or has reasonable
cause to believe is less than eighteen years of age") with N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-02
(1985Xit is unlawful to transfer a handgun to a person the transferor knows or has reason to
believe is under 18 years of age).
4. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 7. William Boyer's father, James Boyer, had talked
with Kathryn Boyer about purchasing a pistol for William and James Boyer had approved
the purchase that took place at Scheels Hardware. Brief for Appellee Scheels Hardware &
Sports Shop at 49, First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D.
1988XNo. 870134).
5. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 7. William had previously discussed handguns with a
Scheels Hardware salesperson on three occasions. Id.
6. Id. Federal law requires a firearm to be registered with the federal government
when it is transferred. See 26 U.S.C. § 5841(bX1983Xunder National Firearms Registration
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of the store.7 William was familiar with the use of firearms, having
taken a hunter's safety course.' Steven Holen was shot three days
after the handgun had been purchased.9
In a special verdict, a district court jury found both Scheels
Hardware and Kathryn Boyer negligent; however, the jury found
that neither the actions of Scheels Hardware nor Kathryn Boyer
was the proximate cause of Steven's injury.' ° The district court

jury also found that Steven Holen and William Boyer were both
negligent and that each boy's conduct was a fifty percent proxi-

mate cause of Steven's damages." After the jury returned its verdict, the district court, pursuant to section 9-10-07 of the North

Dakota Century Code, awarded no damages and dismissed the
plaintiff's action on its merits. 1 2 On appeal, the North Dakota

Supreme Court held that Karlene Holen may recover for the loss
of her son's society and companionship caused by the negligence

of Scheels Hardware and extended the doctrine of negligent
entrustment to situations involving the sale of guns.' 3 First Trust
and Transfer Record "[e]ach firearm transferred shall be registered to the transferee by the
transferor"); 79 AM. JUR. 2D Weapons & Firearms § 32 (1975XNational Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record is a creation of the National Firearms Act which provides
criminal penalties and forfeiture of firearms for violations).
7. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 7. North Dakota law provides that a person under
eighteen years of age may not possess a handgun except under adult supervision and for
".purposes of firearm safety training, target shooting, or hunting." N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.102-01(4X1985 & Supp. 1987Xviolation of section 62.1-02-01(4) constitutes class A
misdemeanor).
8. Brief of Appellee Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop at 48, First Trust Co. v. Scheels
Hardware & Sports Shop, 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D. 1988XNo. 870134). At the time of the sale,
William was not agitated and acted normal. Id. William also owned two twenty-two caliber
rifles and a shotgun. Id.
9. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 7. There was no dispute that before the shooting the
boys had been handling the gun. Id.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. Under North Dakota law, if the plaintiff's negligence is as great as the
defendant's negligence, no award is possible. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1985). Section 910-07 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in relevant part:
Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in
injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed must be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.
Id. Accidental discharge of a gun is presumptive evidence of negligence. See 79 AM. JUR.
2D Weapons & Firearms § 35 (1975Xcivil liability for injuries resulting from discharge of
handgun).
12. FirstTrust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 8. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987Xthere is no
recovery for a victim who is 50 percent or more negligent for the victim's own injury). For
the relevant text of section 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 11.
The district court denied the plaintiffs' alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 8.
13. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 9, 11. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
the district court decision remanding the case for a new trial on the claims against Scheels
Hardware. Id. at 14. The court held that the jury should have been given an instruction on
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Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D.
1988).
negligent entrustment for the claim against Scheels Hardware. Id. at 9. The negligent
entrustment instruction was requested by the plaintiffs and was contained in jury
instruction No. 22, "Transfer of Firearm," which provided:
One who sells directly or through a third person an item, including a firearm, to
another whom the seller knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his
youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use in a manner involving unreasonable
risk of physical harm to himself or others whom the seller should expect to share
in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability or physical harm resulting to
them.
Brief for Appellants at 51, First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, 429 N.W.2d 5
(N.D. 1988XNo. 870134). The trial court in First Trust Company had instructed the jury on
ordinary negligence. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 8. The definition of ordinary negligence regarding civil cases stated in the North Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction manual:
"'Ordinary negligence' is the lack of ordinary care and diligence required by the circumstances. Ordinary care of diligence means such care as a person of ordinary prudence usually exercises about his own affairs of ordinary importance." N.D. PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 105 (1986).
The North Dakota Supreme Court summarily addressed a number of other issues
raised by plaintiffs including:
1) Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the assumption of risk doctrine.
First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 9. The court stated that the assumption of risk doctrine
had been abolished in North Dakota. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1976)
(assumption of risk language omitted from this comparative negligence law). Hence,
the supreme court ruled that the assumption of risk instruction was unnecessary. First
Trust Co., 429 at 9.
2) Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding firearm sales procedures
and prior unlawful sales by Scheels Hardware. Id. at 11. The trial court excluded the
evidence determining that such evidence lacked probative value. Id. The supreme
court affirmed this ruling holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id.
3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to amend
the complaint to assert punitive damages against Scheels Hardware. Id. at 11. Rule
15(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides that amendments should
be allowed when justice so requires. N.D.R. Civ. P. 15(a) reprintedin NORTH DAKOTA
RULES OF COURT 37 (1988). The supreme court stated that a trial court's decision on
such a matter is not to be overruled unless an abuse of discretion is found. First Trust
Co., 429 N.W.2d at 9. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint. Id.
4) Whether the trial court erred when it admitted testimony indicating that Steven Holen
shot at a hockey puck with a twenty-two caliber rifle in the basement of his home on
the day of the accident. Id. at 11. The supreme court noted that Rule 404(b) of the
North Dakota Rules of Evidence does not allow admission of evidence of prior acts to
prove a person's character. Id. at 12. See N.D.R. EVID. 404(b) reprinted in NORTH
DAKOTA RULES OF COURT 425 (1988). However, the trial judge found probative value
in the evidence regarding Steven's knowledge of loading and using twenty-two caliber
weapons; hence, the court found that the evidence was admissible. First Trust Co., 429
N.W.2d at 12.
5) Whether the trial court erred by excluding certain testimony by an expert witness
regarding injury prevention and injury epidemiology. Id. at 12. The trial court did not
allow the expert witness to give an opinion on whether Scheels Hardware could have
foreseen that the sale of the gun to William Boyer could result in an injury. Id. The
plaintiffs argued that Rule 704 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence allows expert
testimony even though it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
Id. See N.D.R. EVID. 704 reprinted in NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF COURT 464 (1988).
The trial court excluded the testimony as being outside the scope of the witness' expertise and because it tended to invade the province of the jury. First Trust Co., 429
N.W.2d at 12. The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it excluded testimony regarding injury prevention and injury epidemiology. Id.
6) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining an objection to testimony
from a Scheels Hardware employee regarding the foreseeability of an accidental shoot-
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The first portion of this comment will discuss the development of the negligent entrustment doctrine in North Dakota and
its extension in First Trust Company. The second portion will
focus on recoveries in North Dakota under a loss of consortium
claim for death or injury of a close family member, specifically the
right of a parent to recover for the loss of a child's society and
companionship as set forth in First Trust Company.
NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
The doctrine of negligent entrustment is best described in
section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which subjects
suppliers to liability for physical harm caused by a chattel when
they know or have reason to know that the chattel may be used in

7)

8)

9)

10)

11)

ing when a handgun is in the possession of a person under 17 years of age. Id. at 12.
The trial judge sustained the objection to the employee's testimony because of inadequate foundation by plaintiff's counsel. Id. The supreme court ruled that the trial
court did not commit reversible error. Id.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a supervisor of hunter education classes to give statistical testimony regarding the foreseeability of a shooting accident. Id. at 12-13. The supreme court ruled that the witness was not a qualified expert
to testify on accident probabilities, but that the witness was allowed to offer the statistical testimony on foreseeability; thus, the trial court did not err in allowing the statistical
testimony. Id. at 13.
Whether the trial court erred by allowing a jury [???]uction patterned after the plaintiffs' instruction request regarding the foreseeability as an element of proximate cause
to be given to the jury. Id. The supreme court stated that because of the close similarity between the jury instruction and the plaintiffs' requested instruction, the plaintiffs
invited an alleged error and therefore waived the right to raise an objection on appeal.
Id. The supreme court found that the trial court did not err in allowing the jury
instruction regarding foreseeability. Id.
Whether the trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiffs' requested jury instruction
that firearms were dangerous instrumentalities. Id. The supreme court ruled that the
plaintiffs failed to persuade the court that the trial court erred in denying the jury
instruction concerning firearms. Id.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing the plaintiffs' jury instruction on loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages. Id. The supreme court indicated that
the trial court's instructions adequately apprised the jury on the law on damages. Id.
The trial court's instructions told the jury it could consider the following items in arriving at a verdict for damages: 1) compensation for the reasonable value of medical
expenses; 2) compensation for the reasonable value of loss of productive time; 3) reasonable compensation for pain, discomfort, and mental anguish; and 4) reasonable compensation for complete or partial permanent disability in health, mind, or person. Id. The
supreme court ruled that the trial court did not err by refusing to give the jury the
plaintiffs' requested instruction on enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages.
Id. The supreme court reasoned that the plaintiffs could have used loss of enjoyment of
life as an element in their argument supporting damages for pain, discomfort, and
mental anguish. Id.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 14. The test used when considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is whether the evidence leads to only one conclusion for which reasonable
minds would not differ. Id. The supreme court ruled that there was room for difference of opinion on whether the negligence of Scheels Hardware and Kathryn Boyer
was a proximate cause of the injuries; therefore, the supreme court found that the
motion was correctly denied. Id.
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an unreasonable manner.' 4 Most often the doctrine of negligent
entrustment was applied where the chattel was latently defective
or inherently dangerous and where the entrustee was a child or
was incompetent.'
This application grew out of common law
which subjected a person to liability for entrusting a "potentially
6
dangerous instrumentality" to a child.'
In addition, the doctrine of negligent entrustment had roots in
the "family purpose doctrine."' 7 Under the family purpose doctrine, a person who purchased an automobile for use by his or her
family was liable for physical injuries caused by a family member's
negligent operation of the automobile." As the family purpose
doctrine evolved, the law of agency attached to create a masterservant relationship between the furnishing automobile owner
and the family member driving the vehicle. 9 The master-servant
relationship was used to create liability in the vehicle owner by
14. Woods, Negligent Entrustment: Evaluation of a Frequently Overlooked Source of
Additional Liability, 20 ARK. L. REV. 101, 101 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 390 (1965). Section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of
his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving
unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier
should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for
physical harm resulting to them.
Id.
15. See Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 48 Mich. App. 580, -, 211 N.W.2d 44, 4546 (1973Xthe theory of negligent entrustment hinges on whether the entrustee may
become a negligent user, not on the nature of the chattel). See also Woods, Negligent
Entrustment Revisited: Developments 1966-76, 30 ARK. L. REV. 288; 291 (1976Xalthough
Fredericks acknowledged the negligent entrustment doctrine was used mostly in
automobile cases, the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the doctrine to a defective power
tool injury case).
16. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, -, 254 N.W.2d 759, 767 (1977Xentrusting a
chattel to a child who is likely to create a risk to third person is, in itself, an unreasonable
risk).
17. See generally Annotation, Comment Note-Modern Status of Family Purpose
Doctrine with Respect to Motor Vehicles, 8 A.L.R. 3D 1191 (1966Xdiscussing attempts to
impute driver's negligence. to automobile owner using the family purpose doctrine). The
family purpose doctrine was a response to increased litigation resulting from the countless
accidents spawned by the mass production of automobiles. Id. at 1195. The North Dakota
Supreme Court called the family purpose doctrine the "family car doctrine." Posey v.
Krogh, 65 N.D. 490, __, 259 N.W. 757, 759 (1934Xowner of family car was potentially
responsible for accidents caused by family members authorized to use the car). The family
purpose doctrine, however, may have been applied by the courts before the advent of the
automobile. Annotation, supra, at 1196.
18. Posey, 65 N.D. at -, 259 N.W. at 759. An automobile owner's liability was based
on
his or her control over the vehicle at the time of the accident. Id. at __, 259 N.W. at 758.
See also Annotation, supra note 17, at 1199 (ownership of the vehicle by the defendant was
one element to be established by a plaintiff pursuing a claim under the family purpose
doctrine).
19. Annotation, supra note 17, at 1196 (the master-servant relationship imputed
negligence to the automobile owner and theoretically burdened the person most capable of
paying off a claim).
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imputing the servant-driver's negligence to the master-owner.20
Eventually the family purpose doctrine was expanded to
become a doctrine of negligent entrustment applicable beyond
the automobile. 2 1 For instance, in Moning v. Alfono 2 2 the Michigan Supreme Court expanded the family purpose doctrine by
allowing the jury to decide whether a manufacturer and distributor were liable to a bystander injured by a slingshot marketed
directly to children. 2 3 In its discussion of the negligent entrustment doctrine, the court observed that the doctrine was not peculiar to automobiles.2 4 Instead, the court explained that the
negligent entrustment doctrine involved the application of general principles to be considered when determining whether the
entrustor's conduct was reasonable in light of apparent risk. 2' The
court further stated that when a child uses a chattel, a reasonable
person entrusting the chattel would consider the child's immaturity, inexperience, and carelessness associated with the chattel's
use. 26 Hence, the court concluded that it was reasonable for a person who entrusted a chattel to another to consider the risks
involved in that entrustment.2 7
Another example of the expansion of the negligent entrust-

ment doctrine by the Michigan courts can be found in Fredericks
v. General Motors Corp.28 which involved an injury caused by a
defective power tool. 2 9 In Fredericks an employee lost part of his
20. Id. Under the family purpose doctrine, the plaintiff was required to prove four
elements: 1) that the defendant owned, controlled, or maintained the car; 2) that the user
was a member of the family entitled to use the vehicle; 3) that the use at the time of the
accident was for a family purpose; and 4) that the owner gave the driver general permission
to use the vehicle. Id.
21. See generally Woods, supra note 15, at 288 (courts use negligent entrustment in a
variety of fact situations to pin liability on manufacturers and sellers of chattels that cause
injury).
22. 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977).
23. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, __, 254 N.W.2d 759, 763 (1977). The Michigan
Supreme Court held that a reasonable person who entrusts a chattel to a child will consider
the child's immaturity, inexperience, and carelessness. Id. at __, 254 N.W.2d at 769 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 comment k (1965Xadult should recognize that a
child's inexperience will cause child to act carelessly)).
24. Moning, 400 Mich. at __, 254 N.W.2d at 768.
25. Id. Case law applying the negligent entrustment doctrine generally involved
automobiles, but the doctrine was not restricted in its application by the nature of the
chattel. Id. at -, 254 N.W.2d at 768 n.24.
26. Id. at -, 254 N.W.2d at 769.
27. Id. at -, 254 N.W.2d at 769. The court stated that an adult should realize that a
child's immaturity causes the child to act carelessly or recklessly regardless of the child's
requisite skill. Id. at -, 254 N.W.2d at 769.
28. 48 Mich. App. 580, 211 N.W.2d 44 (1973).
29. Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 48 Mich. App. 580, -, 211 N.W.2d 44, 45
(1973). The court applied the negligent entrustment theory from the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, specifically citing comment (b) of section 390. Id. at -, 211 N.W.2d at 45. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 comment b (1965). Comment (b) of section 390 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides in part:
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left hand as the result of his operation of an unguarded power
press.3" The Michigan Court of Appeals employed the negligent
entrustment theory and held the defendant supplier liable for the
employee's injuries because the defendant supplier knew of the
unsafe operation of the machine." The court noted that the doctrine of negligent entrustment generally applied to inherently
dangerous or latently defective chattels supplied to a child or
incompetent person.32 However, relying on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the court concluded that the negligent entrustment doctrine was not restricted to such a narrow application.33
The negligent entrustment doctrine is discussed in section 309 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts which provides that the chattel
causing harm need not be defective.34 Hence, the court reasoned
that although the power press was not defective, the doctrine of
negligent entrustment was applicable because the supplier knew
the machine would not be properly operated.35
As the scope of the negligent entrustment doctrine broadened, it became a source of recovery from gun sellers for physical
harm caused by firearms.36 However, some courts reject a theory
[O]ne who supplies a chattel for the use of another who knows its exact character
and condition is not entitled to assume that the other will use it safely if the
supplier knows or has reason to know that such other is likely to use it
dangerously, as where the other belongs to a class which is notoriously
incompetent to use the chattel safely, or lacks the training and experience
necessary for such use, or the supplier knows that the other has on occasions so
acted that the supplier should realize that the chattel is likely to be dangerously
used, or that the other, though otherwise capable of using the chattel safely, has
a propensity of fixed purpose to misuse it. This is true even though the chattel is
in perfect condition, or though defective, is capable of safe use for the purposes
for which it is supplied by an ordinary person who knows of its defective
condition.
Id.
30. Fredericks,48 Mich. App. at -, 211 N.W.2d at 45. The defendant owned the die set
used on the power press which lacked adequate safety devices and injured the plaintiff. Id.
at __, 211 N.W.2d at 45.

31. Id. at -, 211 N.W.2d at 45. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that the
employee was an intervening foreseeable cause of the injuries, but that the employee's
intervention did not extinguish the defendant's liability for supplying a chattel which the
defendant knew was unsafe for the intended purposes. Id. at -, 211 N.W.2d at 45-46.
32. Id. at -' 211 N.W.2d at 45.
33. Id. at ..,211 N.W.2d at 46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 comment
b (1965). For the text of comment (b) of section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
see supra note 28.
34. Frederick, 48 Mich. App. at -, 211 N.W.2d at 46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 390 comment b (1965). For the text of comment (b) of section 390 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, see supra note 28.
35. Frederick, 48 Mich. App. at -, 211 N.W.2d at 46. The court found that it was
irrelevant in a question of a supplier's liability whether the chattel transaction occurred as a
gift, sale, loan, bailment, or in some other manner. Id. at -, 211 N.W.2d at 46.
36. See Semeniuk v. Chentis, 1 111. App. 2d 508, -, 117 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1954Xgun
retailer held liable when parents purchased air rifle for use by their son who was less than
seven years old); Sickles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Misc. 2d 1000, __, 167 N.Y.S.2d 977,
979 (Sup. Ct. 1957Xgun seller held liable for sale of air gun to parents who gave gun to nine-
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which would find a firearm supplier liable for negligent entrustment. 37 Some courts which have refused to apply the negligent
entrustment theory to firearm sales reasoned that if a state statute

was not violated, there was no 3illegal
sale; therefore, the gun
8
retailer should not be held liable.
The case of Bernethy v. Walter Failor's,Inc. 31 is an example of
the analysis used by courts to encompass the supply of firearms
within the negligent entrustment doctrine.4 ° In Bernethy the
Washington Supreme Court found a gun retailer liable for negligently entrusting a rifle to an intoxicated husband who later shot

and killed his wife. 4 ' The court stated that there was a general
duty not to furnish dangerous instrumentalities, like guns, to a person incapacitated by alcohol. 4 2 The court reasoned that intoxi-

cated persons were "incompetent

persons" as defined for

negligent entrustment purposes under section 390 of the Restate-

ment (Second) of Torts. 43 Therefore, the court concluded that the
gun retailer would be liable under the doctrine of negligent
year-old son); McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa. 584, -, 119 A. 721, 721 (1923Xgun store owner
liable even though minor purchaser of shotgun negligently shot a youngster); Bernethy v.
Walt Failor's Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, -, 653 P.2d 280, 283 (1982Xgun dealer held liable for
selling gun to intoxicated husband who shot his wife).
37. See Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1965Xgun retailer
not liable when 15-year-old boy accidentally discharged gun injuring a third person on a
hunting trip); Everett v. Carter, 490 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986Xgun retailer
not liable because it was not foreseeable that retailer's sale of gun would result in a criminal
act); Corey v. Kaufman & Chernick, Inc., 70 R.I. 27, -, 36 A.2d 103, 105 (1944Xgun retailer
not liable when father purchased gun for 15-year-old son and gun was used by 12-year-old
boy who injured the plaintiff); Hulsebosch v. Ramsey, 435 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968Xgun seller not liable when 16-year-old boy injured a third party with a gun purchased
as a gift for his father); Masone v. Unishops of Modell's, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 611, -, 422 N.Y.S.2d
450, 451 (1979Xgun retailer not liable when mother purchased rifle for 12-year-old son who
shot another child).
38. Masone, 73 A.D.2d at -, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 451-52 (gun retailer was not liable
because statute was not violated when minor child, who caused injury with an air rifle, was
present when his mother purchased the air rifle); Corey, 70 R.I. at -, 36 A.2d at 105 (statute
allowed sale of gun to 16-year-old boy; hence, gun retailer was not liable for injuries
inflicted by the boy's use of the gun).
39. 97 Wash. 2d 929, 653 P.2d 280 (1982).
40. Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, -, 653 P.2d 280, 283 (1982).
41. Id. at -, 653 P.2d at 284. The Washington state law did not specifically prohibit
firearm sales to intoxicated persons, but state statutes prohibited such sales to incompetent
persons which the Washington Supreme Court reasoned included intoxicated persons, with
both types of sales falling under the umbrella of the negligent entrustment doctrine. Id. at
__ 653 P.2d at 283-84. The court adopted section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as a basis for its holding that a gun retailer is liable for selling a firearm to an intoxicated
person who shoots another person. Id. at __, 653 P.2d at 283. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 390 (1965Xsupplier of chattel who knows or has reason to know the chattel may
pose an unreasonable risk of physical harm is liable for injuries caused by the chattel). For
the text of section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see supra note 14.
42. Bernethy, 97 Wash. 2d at -, 653 P.2d at 283. The court rejected the argument
that the doctrine of negligent entrustment should not be applicable where the harm was
the result of criminal instead of civil conduct. Id. at -, 653 P.2d at 283.
43. Id. at -, 653 P.2d at 283. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965). For
the text of section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see supra note 14.
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entrustment if it was shown that the retailer entrusted a gun to a
person the retailer knew or had reason to know was intoxicated.44
Some jurisdictions do not apply the doctrine of negligent
entrustment to sellers.4" In jurisdictions which do not recognize
the doctrine of negligent entrustment, many common-law immunities which insulate tortfeasors from liability for their conduct
have been stripped away, thereby exposing sellers and other
entrustors to liability.46 For example, automobile guest statutes
which prevented vehicle guests from collecting damages for automobile accident injuries are no longer thwarting such recovery.47
Various factors may limit the application of the negligent
entrustment doctrine to the sale of firearms. 48 For instance,
because the doctrine of negligent entrustment applies traditional
principles of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the entrustment proximately caused the injuries suffered in order to
recover.49 Another limiting factor is that several jurisdictions
deny -recovery in cases of seller-entrustor. 50 The jurisdictions
denying recovery against a seller-entrustor reason that the sellerpurchaser relationship is more distant and lacks the legal connection found in other relationships. 5 1 Under a distant relationship,
the seller is thought to have no control over the user. 52 The lack of
control over the negligent person's conduct is the basis for the conclusion that the seller should not be held legally responsible. 3
The development of the negligent entrustment doctrine in
North Dakota followed the pattern of development found in other
44. Bernethy, 97 Wash. 2d at __,653 P.2d at 283.
45. Note, Torts: Does the Negligent EntrustmentDoctrine Apply to Sellers?, 39 U. FLA.
L. REV. 925, 927 (1988).
46. Turley, Manufacturers' & Suppliers Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky.L.
REV. 41, 43 (1982). Some recoveries for physical harm by firearms are defeated by
intervening or superseding third-party conduct; however, strict liability provides recovery
in cases where the intervening force is foreseeable to the defendant. Id. at 48.
47. Turley, supra note 46, at 44 (in addition to the gradual disappearance of guest
statutes, more jurisdictions are allowing municipalities to be sued for torts).
48. See Note, supra note 45, at 926 (plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew or
had reason to know that entrustee's actions would create unreasonable risk of harm to
others).
49. Id. at 926.
50. Id. at 927. Traditionally the doctrine of negligent entrustment was applied to
parent-child, employer-employee, and principal-agent relationships because they were
legal relationships. Id. For some courts, to find a person vicariously liable for another
person's actions, a legal connection is essential. See id.
51. Id. Public policy has dictated that negligence for wrongful conduct be imputed
only to persons who have control over another person's conduct. Id.
52. See id. (when the chattel seller has no control over the user of a chattel, the seller is
not liable under the negligence theory).
53. Id. Those jurisdictions which do not hold the seller liable do not recognize the
negligent entrustment doctrine if there is a relationship warranting the maxim "qui facit
per alium facit per se - he who acts through another acts by or through himself." Id.
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jurisdictions which utilized the doctrine primarily in cases of auto-

mobile accidents.54 The recognition of a cause of action for negligent entrustment in North Dakota dates back to the 1930s in the
case of Posey v. Krogh.5 In Posey the North Dakota Supreme
Court recognized the doctrine of negligent entrustment as a valid
claim in North Dakota; however, it limited recovery under the
doctrine by requiring that the State's guest statute be applied to
the doctrine.5 6 The court noted that the guest statute relieved the
automobile owner of liability to a guest injured in an accident

unless the guest could show the owner was grossly negligent.5 7
Despite this limitation, the theory of negligent entrustment was
used successfully in a number of automobile accident cases in
58
North Dakota.
In North Dakota the negligent entrustment doctrine was not

applied to chattels other than automobiles until 1986.5' The North
Dakota Supreme Court extended the doctrine of negligent
entrustment to chattels other than automobiles in Barsness e Gen-

eral Diesel & Equipment Co. 60 In Barsness a crane supplier was
found liable for physical injuries caused by the negligent operation
of a crane leased by the supplier to a church. 61 The court adopted
54. See Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 842 (N.D. 1986)
(North Dakota Supreme Court has traditionally applied the negligent entrustment doctrine
to automobile accident cases).
55. 65 N.D. 490,-__, 259 N.W. 757, 758-59 (1934). In Posey the North Dakota Supreme
Court refused to hold an automobile owner liable for injuries although the owner's brother
negligently drove the owner's car on a pleasure trip and caused physical injuries to another
person. Id. at __, 259 N.W. at 761. The court denied recovery because the injured
passenger failed to establish that the owner permitted her brother to use the car for a
pleasure trip or that she was grossly negligent in entrusting the car to her brother's use. Id.
at -, 259 N.W. at 760.

56. Posey, 65 N.D. at -, 259 N.W. at 762. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-03 (repealed
in 1979). The North Dakota guest statute limited recovery for gross negligence which the
statute defined as "such a degree of recklessness as approaches wanton and willful
misconduct." Id.
57. Posey, 55 N.D. at -, 259 N.W. at 760-61 (under the North Dakota guest statute the
burden was on the injured guest to prove an automobile owner's gross negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident).
58. See Rau v. Kirschenman, 208 N.W.2d 1, 5 (N.D. 1973Xfather was not liable for
entrusting his vehicle to a son who negligently drove the vehicle and caused injuries to a
third person); Posey v. Krogh 65 N.D. 490, -, 259 N.W. 757, 761 (1935Xinjured passenger
failed to meet the burden of proving gross negligence on the part of the vehicle owner;
hence, the owner was found not liable for the injuries). But see Rodgers v. Freborg, 240
N.W.2d 63, 65 (N.D. 1976Xstate guest statute thwarted recovery for passenger injured
when father entrusted automobile to son).
59. Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 842 (N.D. 1986)
(negligent entrustment doctrine applied to hold crane supplier liable for injuries caused by
negligent crane operator).
60. 383 N.W.2d 840, 844 (1986). In Barsness, the court held that, under the negligent
entrustment doctrine, it was foreseeable that an inexperienced crane operator could cause
injuries; hence, the crane supplier was liable if the supplier was aware of the operator's
inexperience. Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 844 (N.D. 1986).
61. Id. at 844. The court held that because reasonable minds could differ on the issue
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the reasoning of section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

and found the crane supplier responsible for entrusting its equipment to persons whom the supplier had reason to know may mis62
use it.

The North Dakota Supreme Court considered expanding the
negligent entrustment doctrine further when it was asked to

decide whether the doctrine should apply to a gun retailer in First
Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc.6 3 The supreme
court based its opinion in First Trust Company on its decision in
Barsness which recognized that the negligent entrustment doc-

trine could be utilized for chattels other than automobiles.6 4 In its
reasoning in First Trust Company, the supreme court embraced
section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, stating that the
negligent entrustment doctrine applied when a chattel supplier

had reason to know the chattel's use may involve unreasonable
risk of harm.6 The court concluded that any chattel transaction is
governed by the negligent entrustment doctrine when foresee-

able, unreasonable risk of harm may result.66
The North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence in First Trust Company to put the question of negligent entrustment by the gun retailer to the jury.67 The court
reasoned that a jury instruction on negligent entrustment was
required because it may have a direct effect on the jury's determination of causation. 68 A determination of causation may be
affected by the doctrine of negligent entrustment because under
the doctrine a foreseeable misuse of a chattel cannot be a superof foreseeability, the jury should consider whether the crane supplier had reason to foresee
misuse of its leased crane. Id. at 844.
62. Id. at 842. The court recognized that without the issue of foreseeability of the
crane's misuse, the trial judge could have decided the issue as a matter of law. Id. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965Xa supplier of a chattel who foresees misuse
of a chattel is liable for injuries caused by such misuse). For the text of section 390 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts see supra note 14.
63. 429 N.W.2d 5, 8 (N.D. 1988).
64. First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, 429 N.W.2d 5, 8 (N.D. 1988).
See Barsness, 383 N.W.2d at 842 (negligent entrustment doctrine was not limited to
automobile cases but expanded to cover suppliers of cranes as well as other chattels).
65. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390
(1965). For the text of section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see supra note 14.
66. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 8.
67. Id. While the supreme court did not elaborate on what specific evidence it
deemed significant under the negligent entrustment doctrine, the facts of the case imply
that Scheels Hardware could have foreseen the misuse of the handgun. Id. at 8-9. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965Xthose who supplychattels to children have
reason to know that the children, because of youthfulness and inexperience, are likely to
use the chattel in a way which may harm a third person). For the text of section 390 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, see supra note 14.
68. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 9.
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seding intervening cause to extinguish the supplier's liability. 6 9
The supreme court further recognized that the general principles
of intervening forces are applicable to negligent entrustment situations.7 Consequently, the court reasoned that Scheels Hardware
would be liable for Steven Holen's injury if it were found that
Scheels Hardware knew or should have known that its sale of the
gun to William Boyer could endanger William or others. 7 '
The ruling in First Trust Company reinforces the North
Dakota Supreme Court's previous position that the doctrine of
negligent entrustment is applicable to chattels other than
automobiles.7 2 Furthermore, the decision in First Trust Company
suggests that North Dakota may apply the negligent entrustment

doctrine to any case involving injuries where the supplier could
foresee that a chattel is likely to cause unreasonable harm to
others.7 3 In addition, the First Trust Company case specifically
69. Id. at 8. The North Dakota Supreme Court turned to the reasoning of Prosser and
Keeton to explain why a child's misuse of a firearm cannot dismiss the firearm supplier's
liability because the supplier should have foreseen the risk. Id. at 8-9. See W.L. PROSSER &
W.P. KEETON ON TORTS, 303-304 (5th ed. 1984Xentrusting a gun to a child is risky and
potential injuries involve intervening causes which cannot extinguish a gun supplier's
liability). See also Axelson v. Williamson, 324 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. 1982Xin an
automobile accident case, negligent entrustment of an automobile was not superseded by
misuse of the automobile; hence, the entrustor is liable for injuries).
70. FirstTrust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 9. With little explanation, the supreme court quoted
from sections 442(A) and 449 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which pertain to
intervening forces and criminal acts and their relationship to a supplier's conduct. Id. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442(AX1965Xwhen a person's negligent act creates
foreseeable harm, such an intervening cause does not eliminate the person's liability); § 449
(1965Xa third person's actions which makes another person negligent does not eliminate
the first person's liability).
71. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 9. Justice Levine dissented stating that the majority
based its opinion not only on the failure to give the requested instruction on negligent
entrustment, but also on the failure to instruct that foreseeable misuse of a chattel by the
person to whom it has been negligently entrusted cannot be a superseding intervening
cause which extinguishes the suppliers' liability. Id. at 15 (Levine, J., dissenting). Justice
Levine contended that since the plaintiffs did not request the instruction on superseding
cause, the majority implicitly applied the obvious error analysis. Id. In raising obvious
error, the party who fails to object at the trial level has the burden on appeal to show that
the error affected the outcome of the case. Id. at 16. Justice Levine did not believe that the
failure to instruct on superseding cause is so fundamental that, it creates a miscarriage of
justice. Id. Because Justice Levine believed that the jury verdict would not have changed
even if the superseding cause instruction had been given, the error was not fundamental.
Id. Thus, Justice Levine affirmed the trial court. Id.
Justice VandeWalle reluctantly concurred. Id. at 14 (VandeWalle, J., concurring).
Justice VandeWalle agreed with the majority that the case should be remanded for a new
trial and that the instruction on negligent instruction be given. Id. at 14. Justice
VandeWalle's concurrence was reluctant because he, as did Justice Levine, had serious
doubts that the jury would have decided the case differently if any other instruction had
been given. Id. at 14; see id. at 16 (Levine, J., dissentingXJustice Levine did not believe the
jury verdict would have changed with the superseding cause instructions).
72. Id. at 8. See Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 842 (N.D.
1986Xdoctrine of negligent entrustment is not limited to automobile cases, but may apply
to other chattels such as cranes).
73. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 8. The North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that
there is no reason why the doctrine of negligent entrustment should not apply to chattels
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implies that gun retailers must become more aggressive in determining who will use their products after sale to prevent firearm
injuries.
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
Loss of consortium has been a cause of action for hundreds of
years.7 4 Under the common law, loss of consortium began as a
cause of action for a husband who lost the services of his wife due
to another's wrongful acts.7 5 The loss of services action was premised on the theory that a wife was her husband's servant and the
husband, as master, had a proprietary right to his wife's services;
therefore, any intentional interference with the wife's services
created a cause of action for the husband.7 6 Over time, the
master-servant relationship between husband and wife was coined
"consortium" and comprised many legal rights including services,
society, 77 and sexual intercourse. 7 Loss of services was the dominant element in a husband's cause of action for loss of consortium;7 9 however, some courts compensated for loss of affection,

creating a legal fiction which treated a claim for loss of companionship as analogous to a claim for loss of services.8 0 Because of the
difficulty in measuring loss of affection, some courts adopted a
pecuniary loss standard which compensated only for the loss of a
wife's services, and thereby disallowed recovery for sentimental
other than automobiles when the chattels are entrusted to an incompetent or
inexperienced person. Id.
74. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 874 (4th ed. 1971). An
action arising out of loss of consortium developed as an offshoot of redressing interference
of the master-servant relationship. Id. at 873. See also Comment, Loss of Consortium:
Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 179, 180 (1984Xloss of consortium
traced from common law to modem theories of recovery).
75. Comment, supra note 74, at 183. The loss of a wife's consortium was described as a
loss of "company." See, e.g., Guy v. Livesey, 79 Eng. Rep. 428, 428 (1618Xhusband allowed
to recover damages for lost company of his injured wife).
76. W. PROSSER, supra note 74, at 874. The relation between husband and wife was
based on a form of marriage recognized by law. Id. Eventually, courts recognized a
husband's claim of action against a negligent tortfeasor, in addition to an intentional
tortfeasor, who infringed upon the husband's proprietary interest which included the wife's
duties of caring for the home, serving her husband, and raising children. Comment, supra
note 74, at 184.
77. Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N.H. 289
99 A. 298, 301 (1916). See Comment,
supra note 74, at 182-83 (as an aid in defining the term consortium, society embraced a
broad range of benefits family members received from each other such as love, care,
companionship, comfort, and protection).
78. W. PROSSER, supra note 74, at 874. As the loss of consortium claim evolved,
interference with any one of the rights of the husband enjoyed in the husband-wife
relationship was a cause for legal action. Id.
79. Comment, supra note 74, at 184.
80. Id. (few courts made attempts to segregate claims for loss of service and claims for
loss of consortium, compensating for both).
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loss. 8 ' Although jurisdictions were split regarding the proper
recovery of damages for a loss of consortium action, most early
common-law courts recognized the husband's right to be compensated for loss of his wife's society and affection even though a firm
dollar amount could not be attached.8 2 Consequently, the term
"pecuniary loss" was expanded to include non-economic damages
such as lost care, nurturing, companionship, and protection where
the deceased person was a spouse, parent, or child. 3
Eventually, the phrase "loss of consortium" shifted from the
strict interpretation which only allowed a husband's cause of
action to an interpretation encompassing other relational interests
including those enjoyed by the wife.8 4 In the late nineteenth century courts began to recognize a wife's loss of spousal consortium
claim for intentional torts against her husband. 5 Courts reasoned
that it would be unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution to allow a husband recovery for loss of consortium but not a
wife.8 6 A claim by a wife for a negligent act interfering with the
right to her husband's consortium was first recognized in 1950.87
By the early 1970s a majority of jurisdictions allowed women to
bring actions for loss of their husband's consortium caused by
intentional and negligent actions.8 8
Although recovery for loss of consortium claims has been
gradually expanding, as of 1978 only one state allowed children a
claim for loss of parental consortium due to a negligent act.8 9 Children's claims for loss of parental consortium were first raised in the
1920s under the guise of alienation of affection cases which were
81. Id.o
82. Id. at 185.
83. Joselson, Parents' "PecuniaryInjuries"forthe Wrongful Death of an Adult Child:
Where is the Love?, 12 VT. L. REv. 57, 58 (1987).
84. Comment, supra note 74, at 182. The common law has been expanded to protect
the relationships enjoyed by immediate family members. Id.
85. Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1923). The Married Women's Acts allowed women, like men, to freely hold property,
including earnings. Id.
86. Comment, supra note 74, at 191. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
87. Comment, supra note 74, at 188. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813
(D.C. Cir. 1950Xwife recovered under loss of consortium claim against her husband's
employer after injured husband received workmen's compensation and was denied
recovery against his employer), cert. denied 340 U.S. 852, 852 (1950), overruled on other
grounds 242 F.2d 220, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
88. Note, Torts - Arizona Parents Allowed to Recover for Loss of Injured Child's
Consortium, 1986 ARIz. ST. L.J. 127, 130.
89. Comment, The ParentalClaim for Loss of Society and Companionship Resulting

from the Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposalfor Arizona, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909, 914.
Courts have stated many reasons to justify denying children recovery for loss of parental

consortium the most common of which is precedent. Id. at 920.
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based on the defendant's intentional interference with the family
relationship. 90 In the 1940s at least four jurisdictions had allowed
a child's claim for loss of filial consortium due to an intentional
wrongful act. 9 ' However, courts resisted granting children a claim
for loss of filial consortium fearing it would increase lawsuits, create extortionary litigation, and breed problems in determining the
proper recovery.9 2 Regardless of this reasoning, commentators
predict that courts will recognize that protecting a child's interest
in the filial relationship is equally as important as protecting the
will likely
parent's interest; hence, in the future more jurisdictions
93
allow children recovery for loss of filial consortium.
Unlike claims by children for loss of parental consortium,
claims by parents for loss of consortium due to injury or death of a
child are being recognized by more courts. 94 As courts allow par90. Comment, supra note 74, at 197 (in the 1920s courts were beginning to recognize
that common law precedent disallowing a child's claim for loss of consortium could not be
justified).
91. Id. See Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945Xcourt allowed child cause
of action against person who enticed child's father away from family); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F.
Supp. 281, 284 (W.D. Mich. 1949Xchildren allowed cause of action against person who
induced children's mother to desert them); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Il. App. 598, -, 71
N.E.2d 810, 811 (1947Xpotential flood of litigation was not sufficient reason to deny children
a cause of action against person who alienated father's affection); Miller v. Monsen, 228
Minn. 400, -, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1949Xlack of precedent did not justify denying children
right to seek damages against outsider who enticed parent away from them).
92. Comment, supra note 74, at 198-99. See Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, __, 56
A.2d 768, 770 (1947Xminor child refused recovery for damages due to mother's alienation
of affection because, for one reason, it is difficult to determine when childhood ceases);
Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, -, 95 N.E.2d 545, 546 (1950Xminor daughter had no
right of action against a third person for enticing father away from family because a minor
child is not legally entitled to a parent's care or presence).
93. Comment, supra note 74, at 198. See Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp.
739, 741 (D.C. 1952Xcommon law should be continually reinterpreted and changed to meet
current situations; therefore, a child should be allowed to recover for loss of a parent's love
and companionship); Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, -, 267 N.W.2d 124, 125-26
(1978Xcommon law should not remain static, and because of a parent's crucial role in a
child's development, a child will be allowed to recovery loss of parental society).
94. Annotation, Parent'sRight to Recover for Loss of Consortium in Connection with
Injury to Child, 54 A.L.R. 4th 115, 116 (1987); see Howard Frank v. Superior Court, 150
Ariz. 228, __, 722 P.2d 955, 959-60 (1986Xparent allowed damages for loss of
companionship of injured adult child); Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, -, 705 P.2d 1360, 1361,
1365 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1985Xmistaken administration of liquid cocaine to son resulted in
award to parents for damages for loss of filial consortium); Yordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844,
846 (Fla. 1973Xcause of action is available to parents who suffered indirect economic losses
after pediatrician negligently treated minor child); Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, -, 242
P.2d 971, 977 (1952Xparents allowed to maintain action for loss of minor child's society
stemming from automobile accident); Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, __, 469
N.E.2d 659, 666 (1984Xfather recovered for loss of son's society due to psychiatric
treatment which alienated son's affection for father); Craig v. IMT Ins. Co., 407 N.W.2d 584,
586 (Iowa 1987Xparents may recover damages from loss of unborn child's consortium after
fetus died following an automobile accident); Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, __, 134
N.W.2d 611, 615 (19 65Xparents allowed to claim loss of child's society in wrongful death
action); Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, __, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960Xparents may
recover pecuniary value of adult son's life); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, __, 113
N.W.2d 355, 357 (1961Xcourt found pecuniary loss test too restrictive and allowed parent to
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ents to recover for loss of filial consortium, they move away from
the traditional theory that damages are allowed strictly for easy to
measure pecuniary losses. 9 5 One reason for this move to parentchild consortium claims might be that parents derive pleasure
from children, choosing to have children because of nontangible
benefits like emotional bonding.9 6 These nontangible benefits are
viewed by most parents to outweigh child rearing costs. 9 7 Furthermore, courts began to recognize that the economic climate
today is much different than in past decades.9" In today's eco-

nomic climate, children are allowed to keep their earnings; hence,
parents are less likely to claim a loss for a minor child's earnings. 99
With the recognition that parents have children because of nontangible benefits and the current economic realities, some courts

have concluded that parents are entitled to recover for loss of a
100
child's comfort and companionship.
In Sanchez v. Schindler o' the Texas Supreme Court rejected
the static pecuniary loss rule and allowed a parent to recover for
recover for loss of advice, comfort, assistance, and protection of child); Norvell v. Cuyahoga
County Hosp., 11 Ohio App. 3d 70, -, 463 N.E.2d 111, 114 (1983Xparent may recover loss
of child's society, services, companionship, comfort, love, and solace when negligent
tortfeasor injures minor child); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983)
(recovery for death of child no longer governed by pecuniary loss and parents may be
compensated for loss of companionship and society for death of minor child); Van Cleave v.
Lynch, 109 Utah 149, -, 166 P.2d 244, 249 (1946Xjury permitted to allow recovery for loss
of child's comfort, society, and companionship); Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, -, 426
P.2d 605, 609 (1967Xwrongful death damages under state statute extended recovery to
include loss of companionship of children); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, -, 225
N.W.2d 495, 499 (1975Xparents allowed to recover loss of child's aid, comfort, society, and
companionship during minority); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 201 (Wyo. 1986)
(husband allowed to recover for the loss of wife's consortium due to negligent death of child
which caused wife's emotional injuries thereby depriving husband of marital consortium).
Other jurisdictions do not allow claims by parents for loss of consortium due to injury or
death of a child. Van Steenburgh v. Sclar, 676 F. Supp. 579, 580 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(Pennsylvania law does not allow parents a loss of filial consortium claim); Tullai v. Homan,
241 Cal. Rptr. 255, 256, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1184, - (1987XCalifornia does not allow parents
to recover for loss of child's consortium).
95. Ferguson, Damagesfor the Death of a Minor Child under the Texas Wrongful
Death Act, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 157, 164 (1972). Some courts recognize that in today's
economic climate a child is not a pecuniary gain but rather a pecuniary loss because of the
costs of raising children and the courts ignore pecuniary formulas compensating for loss of
the child's love. Id. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983Xreal loss for
death of a child is not financial benefit that the child would have given the parent but loss of
the child's love).
96. Bruce, Measure of Damagesfor the Wrongful Death of a Child, 66 CAN. B. REV.
344, 347 (1987).
97. Id.
98. Id. See Shockley v. Prioer, 66 Wis. 2d 394, __, 225 N.W.2d 495, 499 (1975)
(traditionally parents were entitled to children's earnings as well as children's services).
99. Id. at -, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
100. Bruce, supra note 96, at 348. See Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at __, 225 N.W.2d at 499
(children are no longer an economic asset but require great expenditure by parents).
101. 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
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loss of a child's companionship due to a negligent act.' 0 2 Before
this decision, the Texas Supreme Court had limited damages to the
pecuniary value of the child's services and financial contributions
pursuant to a state statute which provided recovery for "actual

damages.

'10 3

The court found that because the Texas wrongful

death statute did not expressly limit damages to pecuniary value,
the court had the authority to interpret amages in conformity with
changing societal norms.10 4 Furthermore, the court noted that
damages for loss of consortium were similar to damages for pain
and suffering and were not too uncertain to be measured in monetary terms.1 0 5 Other jurisdictions moved away from the traditional pecuniary loss theory by expanding the concept of

pecuniary injuries to include not only economic-based losses, but
also noneconomic damages like lost care, nurturing, and companionship. 106 Recovery of noneconomic damages for loss of consortium claims comprise a notable trend followed by the majority
of
10 7
Court.
Supreme
States
United
the
jurisdictions, including

North Dakota case law regarding recovery for loss of consortium claims followed the traditional common-law view that the
102. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983).
103. Id. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (repealed 1985). Although the Texas
statute expressly provided for "actual damages on account of the injuries causing the death"
in wrongful death cases, the statute did not explicitly limit damages to pecuniary losses.
Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 251. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (repealed 1985).
Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that parents could recover damages for loss of
their injured son's love and companionship. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 251.
104. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 252. As of the Texas Supreme Court decision in 1983, 35
states allowed parents loss of consortium claims for the death of a child. Id. See TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (repealed 1985XTexas wrongful death statute read: "actual
damages on account of the injuries causing the death").
105. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253. The court concluded that fear of excessive verdicts is
an insufficient justification to deny recovery for loss of consortium in light of adequate
judicial safeguards to prevent damages based on prejudice rather than fair compensation.
Id. See also Walker v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 343 So. 2d 251, 253 (La. Ct. App. 1977Xno amount
of money adequately compensates parents for loss of a child's companionship, but dollars
are the only method for compensation).
106. Joselson, supra note 83, at 58 (although Vermont has adopted an expansive view
of pecuniary injuries, it has not recognized that parents of unmarried, adult child decedents
are entitled to relational damages). See also S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH, § 3.49, at 318 (1975Xseveral jurisdictions which have followed a strict pecuniary
loss rule now allow recovery for what they term the "pecuniary value" of the decedent's
society and companionship).
107. Joselson, supra note 83, at 64. See also Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S.
573, 587 (1982Xunder maritime law, a longshoreman's wife recovered the "pecuniary" loss
of the decedent's society and companionship following an accident aboard a vessel);
D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 1973Xin assessing damages for noneconomic losses for child's death, federal courts consider remaining period of child's
minority and the cohesiveness of the family unit); Palermo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d
437, 448 (La. Ct. App. 1982Xevidence that child was notably devoted to parents is
significant consideration in calculating damages for emotional loss after child's death);
Vandeburg v. Langan, 192 Neb. 779, __, 224 N.W.2d 366, 371 (1974Xin evaluating noneconomic damages for parent who has lost a child, higher amounts should be given for an
outstanding child who has excelled scholastically and athletically).
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male head-of-household was the only family member allowed to
bring such a claim.1 0 Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme
Court followed the strict interpretation of pecuniary damages for a
loss of consortium claim and compensated only for the value of the
lost services. 10 9 Accordingly, in Stejskal v. Darrow110 the North
Dakota Supreme Court ruled that a father had no wrongful death
claim for loss of companionship and society of his child because a
pecuniary value could not be attached to sentimental and intangible benefits."1 As a result of this narrow interpretation of "pecuniary," the North Dakota Supreme Court refused a parent

damages beyond services the child would have performed for the
parent during the age of minority. 1 2 In addition to refusing compensation for a parent's loss of consortium claim for wrongful
death of a child, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied such
compensation when a child was merely injured, citing the same
reasoning it used in its denial for loss of consortium arising from
13
the wrongful death of a child."
In the 1950s the North Dakota Supreme Court appeared to
soften its view of pecuniary damages regarding loss of society
108. Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337, 246 N.W.2d 747, 749 (N.D. 1976Xas
courts changed common-law views to allow the wife recovery for loss of a husband's
consortium, the North Dakota Supreme Court reexamined common law and allowed a wife
to recover damages for loss of spousal consortium). See also Milde v. Leigh, 28 N.W.2d 530,
534 (N.D. 1947Xhusband entitled to recover loss of wife's services and consortium).
109. See Scherer v. Schlaberg, 18 N.D. 421, __,122 N.W. 1000, 1002 (1909Xrecoverable
damages by father for death of a minor child is the probable value of the child's services
during minority, considering cost of rearing).
110. 55 N.D. 606, 215 N.W. 83 (1927).
111. Stajskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D. 606, __, 215 N.W. 83, 85 (1927XNorth Dakota
Supreme Court followed English common law which denied recovery for sentimental and
intangible benefits arising from the relationship of father and child), overruled, Hopkins v.
McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85, 94 (N.D. 1988). In 1931 the North Dakota Supreme Court
reiterated the Stejskal decision. See Kalsow v. Grob, 61 N.D. 119, __,237 N.W. 848, 849
(1931Xparent was given no recovery for "loss of society or companionship, comfort, joy, or
pleasure" when a child was hit by a car and later died). The denial of nonpecuniary
damages by the court evolved from a decision in the late 1800s in which the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that compensation for loss of consortium was an "imaginary" damage
and served only to punish a negligent person; therefore, it would not be allowed. Haug v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 8 N.D. 23, __, 77 N.W. 97, 102 (1898XNorth Dakota's law on
damages for loss of a relative were patterned after early common-law statutes which were
interpreted to exclusively provide for monetary damages), overruled, 427 N.W.2d 85, 94
(N.D. 1988).
112. Scherer, 122 N.W. at 1002 (parent compensated only for the probable value of the
child's services during minority, considering costs of child rearing during infancy). See also
Haug, 8 N.D. at __, 77 N.W. at 101 (North Dakota Supreme Court followed strict
interpretation of pecuniary damages, reasoning any other damages were imaginary and
would punish the negligent person), overruled, Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85, 94
(N.D. 1988).
113. See Kalsow, 61 N.D. at -,237 N.W. at 849 (no recovery for damages in the way of
solatium).
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claims.' 1 4 The court began to liberally construe "pecuniary loss"
to allow damages for the expected work and assistance a decedent
would have produced in raising the family; however, this did not
include sentimental loss of companionship. 1 5 In conjunction with
the supreme court's increased willingness to award damages
outside immediate monetary losses, the court began to allow compensation for pain and suffering even though such awards could
not be arithmetically calculated."'
In Umphrey v. Decry".7 the court reasoned that wrongful
death damages should not be so narrowly construed as to allow
only immediate loss of money damages and not other damages like
those for loss of maintenance because the word "pecuniary," refer118
ring to money, does not appear in the wrongful death statute.
Despite the court's reasoning in Umphrey, it would not allow
recovery for injured feelings. 1 9 For over thirty years the court
did not allow parents recovery for the hurt feelings associated with
20
the loss of filial companionship.'
In 1988 the North Dakota Supreme Court considered the
issue of whether parents should be allowed to recover damages for
the loss of filial consortium in First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware
& Sports Shop, Inc. 121 In its reasoning, the supreme court recognized the contrary precedent and the dynamic nature of the com12 2
mon law.
114. Henke v. Peyerl, 89 N.W.2d 1, 11 (N.D. 1958Xwhen a child is killed a substantial
loss will be presumed and such loss need not be measured in dollars and cents).
115. See Quam v. Wengert, 86 N.W.2d 741, 753 (N.D. 1957Xjury may consider the
value of the nurture and instruction a deceased father would have given his children had he
lived).
116. Lake v. Neubauer, 87 N.W.2d 888, 891 (N.D. 1958Xpain and suffering damages
are determined according to the "common knowledge, the good sense, and practical
judgment of the jury").
117. 78 N.D. 211, 48 N.W.2d 897 (1951).
118. Umphrey v. Deery, 78 N.D. 211,._, 48 N.W.2d 897, 906 (1951). See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-21-02 (1976). Section 32-21-02 of the North Dakota Century Code provides: "In
an action brought under the provisions of this chapter, the jury shall give such damages as it
finds proportionate to the injury resulting from the death to the persons entitled to the
recovery." Id.
119. Umphrey, 78 N.D. at __, 48 N.W.2d at 913. The North Dakota Supreme Court
refused recovery for "injured feelings" but considered a variety of items in establishing
wrongful death damages such as the deceased's health, mental, and physical capacity, habits
of industry, and customary earnings. Id.
120. See generally McKee v. Thompson, 558 F. Supp. 68 (D.N.D. 1983Xhistory of
North Dakota Supreme Court decisions indicated a willingness to repudiate a strict
construction of pecuniary loss standard).
121. 429 N.W.2d 5, 8 (N.D. 1988). A similar case was decided the same day as First
Trust Co. in which the supreme court also ruled that parents may recover for the loss of filial
consortium. See Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85, 92 (N.D. 1988Xthe loss of a child is a
"deep emotional wounding" that should be compensated for when a child is negligently
injured or killed). See also Jacobs v. Anderson Bldg. Co., 430 N.W.2d 558, 559-60 (N.D.
1988Xparents allowed to recover loss of consortium after daughter was seriously injured).
122. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 10. Quoting from Chief Justice Vanderbilt's
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The supreme court noted that the common-law rule treated
children as servants whose wages were crucial to the family unit;
hence, recovery for the loss of a child related to the economic loss
of the child's earnings. 123 Relying on the Wisconsin case of Shockley v. Prier,124 the court reasoned that today the society and companionship received from children are more important to parents
than the benefit of their children's earning capacity.' 25 In addition, the court noted that the common-law rule denying parental
recovery was being eroded by the changing view of family relationships.' 26 The court stated that to continue denying parents
recovery for loss of filial consortium would be a serious detriment
to society considering the altered attitude toward children; thus,
the court held that parents
may recover for loss of a child's society
27
and companionship.'
After determining that parents may recover for the loss of a
child's society and companionship, the North Dakota Supreme
Court turned to a discussion of how damages for these losses
should be calculated. 2 The court stated that historically only
pecuniary damages, excluding loss of society, were recoverable in
loss of filial consortium cases.' 29 Additionally, the court noted that
comments in State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, -, 129 A.2d 715, 844 (1957), the North Dakota
Supreme Court acknowledged that common law should be changed periodically to adapt to
the current needs of society. Id. (citing State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, -, 129 A.2d 715, 844
(1957)).
123. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 10. The court implied that courts are moving away
from the common-law reasoning that a child's earnings are more significant to parents than
the child's love and affection. Id.
124. 66 Wis. 2d 394, __,225 N.W.2d 495, 498 (1975).
125. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 10. Noting a split in the jurisdictions regarding the
common-law rule of denying parents loss of filial consortium, the supreme court stated that
the common law should be abandoned. Id.
126. Id. The court recognized that a number of jurisdictions had allowed parents to
recover for loss of filial consortium. Id. See Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, __, 705 P.2d 1360,
1361 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1985Xparents allowed to recover for loss of son's consortium after son
died from being given the wrong type of medicine); Dymek v. Nyquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859,
__, 469 N.E.2d 659, 666 (1984Xfather awarded damages for loss of son's consortium
resulting from psychiatric treatments); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d, -, 225 N.W.2d 495,
499 (1975Xparents allowed to recover for loss of child's companionship during minority).
127. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 11. North Dakota's personal injury and wrongful
death statute was amended, effective July 8, 1987, to provide compensation "for a plethora
of noneconomic damages, none of which are capable of precise arithmetic calculation." Id.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04 (Supp. 1987). Section 32-03.2-04 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides in pertinent part:
Compensation for noneconomic damages, which are damages arising from pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish,
emotional distress, fear of injury, loss or illness, loss of society and
companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation and other
nonpecuniary damage.
Id.
128. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 10-11.
129. Id. at 10. See Stejskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D.606, -, 215 N.W. 83, 85 (1927XEnglish
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previous case law in North Dakota adopted the pecuniary loss

standard and refused recovery for parent's loss of filial consortium.' 30 Despite decisions against nonpecuniary recovery, the
North Dakota Supreme Court indicated that the flexibility of the

common law allowed the law to adjust to conform to a changing
society. 1 3 1 Consequently, the court concluded that it was time to
re-examine its position that only pecuniary damages were recoverable.13 2 After this re-examination of its position on damages, the
supcourt determined that society's changed view of children
13
damages.
noneconomic
allowing
for
rationale
the
ported
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that more than
thirty years ago it had given a less restrictive interpretation to
pecuniary loss. 134 The court emphasized its ruling in Henke v.
Peyerl13 5 which, while emphasizing a pecuniary loss standard as

opposed to a nonmoney award, allowed a parent to recover damages involving "comfort... of a kind, faithful and loving child..."

resulting from the wrongful death of a child.13 6 In addition, the
court cited its willingness to award damages for pain and suffering
1 37

although such damages could not be arithmetically calculated.

Hence, consistent with its recent decisions to expand recovery

under the umbrella of pecuniary damages, the North Dakota
Supreme Court ruled in First Trust Company that a parent may
recover for the nonpecuniary loss of society and companionship of
3
a child. 1
The North Dakota Supreme Court's ruling in First Trust Company, allowing parents to recover for loss of filial companionship
common law allowed pecuniary damages as the exclusive recovery and such damages did
not include loss of society or companionship).
130. FirstTrust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 10. See Kalsow v. Grob, 61 N.D. 119,-, 237 N.W.
848, 849 (1931Xin a personal injury action, a father cannot recover for loss of the child's
society and companionship); Stejskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D. 606, __, 215 N.W. 83, 85 (1927)
(father denied recovery against negligent physician following daughter's death because
common law did not allow recovery for nonpecuniary damages).
131. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 10.
132. Id.
133. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized a split of authority in recent
decisions and stated it would follow those courts allowing parents to recover damages for
loss of consortium. Id.
134. Id. 429 N.W.2d at 11. See Umphrey v. Deery, 78 N.D. 211, -, 48 N.W.2d 897,
908 (1951Xin a wrongful death action, the jury was not restricted to immediate monetary
damages but could consider loss of benefits capable of being estimated).
135. 89 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1958).
136. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Henke v. Peyerl, 89 N.W.2d 1, 9 (N.D.
1958Xpecuniary loss is not so narrowly restricted as to include only cash-earning value of a
deceased minor child; hence, jury may consider "all the contingencies involved")).
137. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 11. See Lake v. Neubauer, 87 N.W.2d 888, 891
(N.D. 1958Xto determine damages for an action for pain and suffering, the jury must
employ its common knowledge, good sense, and practical judgment).
138. First Trust Co., 429 N.W.2d at 11.
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and society, signified the court's movement toward expanding
recoveries for nonpecuniary damages resulting from death or
injury of a family member.' 3 9 Accordingly, the court hinted it may
be willing to continue its expansion in this area by considering a
claim by children for loss of parental consortium.' 40 Consequently, the court's movement toward expansion of pecuniary
recovery may mean that children and nonmarital cohabitating
partners may claim recovery for loss of their parent's or partner's
consortium.
Susan Ellison

139. Id.
140. Id. at 11 n.5. There may be no justifiable distinction which would preclude a
child's recovery for loss of parental consortium when a parent is allowed recovery for loss of
filial consortium. Id. See Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 461, -, 563 P.2d 871, 87374, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315, 317-18 (S.Ct. 1977Xdifferences between a parent's claim for loss
of filial consortium and child's claim for loss of parental consortium are not so great as to
justify allowing one claim and denying the other claim).

